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In this study, we develop understanding of factors that shape the propensity of market incumbents to collaborate in response to the threat posed by new market entrants. We are particularly interested in instances when a market's competitive structure becomes unsettled by new entrants who engage in nonconforming strategic tactics. In such situations, we propose two factors – strategic similarity among competitors and market-share instability – will systematically shape competitors' collaborative response to new entrants. To test our theory, we use data on strategic tactics and collaborative dynamics in the US airline industry from 1989 to 2010. We demonstrate that greater strategic similarity among a market's incumbents increases the likelihood of cooperation in response to the threat of a nonconforming new entrant, while greater market-share instability reduces cooperative response. Through this study, we extend existing understanding of the contextual circumstances under which established competitors recognize their mutual interests and band together.

Although two decades have passed since the publication of Walsh and Ungson’s (1991) seminal article on organizational memory, there has been only limited theoretical elaboration and application of this critical aspect of cognition in the strategic management literature. We remedy this gap by advancing the construct of competitive memory, which we define as a firm’s dynamic capability consisting of stored information from its past competitive interaction with a given rival that can be brought to bear on present or future competitive actions. We theorize that competitive memory is composed of both procedural and declarative elements and can be accessed automatically and deliberatively. Additionally, we suggest that competitive memory is relational: As rivals within a competitive set interact in the market, competitive memory drives not only their strategic actions, but also their expectations about their competitors. Last, competitive memory is also dynamic, which can be constructed and reconstructed over time by an organization’s enactment of its internal and external environments and by purposive memory trials with its competitive set.

In this chapter, the author outlines the link between organization design and competitive strategy, focusing on rivalry. A firm’s organization design choices can affect its competitive advantage as well as the strategic decisions of its rivals. Therefore, organization design can influence the nature and intensity of competitive interactions between firms. To illustrate this effect, the author focuses on the literature on divisionalization and offers a set of propositions as examples. Taken together, the author makes three main observations: (1) a firm’s competitive position and objectives are reflected in its organizational choices; (2) heterogeneity in competitive position and objectives lead to heterogeneity in organization design choices across firms; and (3) organization design and competitive strategy are interdependent processes. The author concludes by discussing the implications for strategy and management research and pointing out some opportunities for future research.

In this historical analysis, Jacques Ellul’s theory of propaganda is applied to analyse the changes of China’s propaganda. It is found that China’s propaganda is undergoing structural transformations from depending on human organisation to extensive control and use of media technology. Sociological propaganda as a complement to political propaganda has significantly expanded; integration propaganda replaced agitation propaganda. International image management by the government has become a new dimension of China’s propaganda. The research is one of the first to observe such structural changes.

The purpose of this paper is to explain how a multi-market firm develops the motivation to forbear from competition.

A two-way fixed effects model with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors investigates the research question with panel data collected from the US scheduled passenger airline industry.

The results demonstrate that although the interaction of multi-market contact with strategic similarity impairs a firm’s forbearance from competition, the same interaction promotes it as firm performance deteriorates, supporting the hypotheses.

Performance explains not only how forbearance emerges out of coincidental multi-market contact but also reconciles the mixed evidence for the impact of the two-way interaction between multi-market contact and strategic similarity on forbearance.

Antitrust authorities should pay more attention to low performing firms than to high performing firms in their investigations. Also, managers of multi-market firms should identify multi-market rivals with low performance as targets for the initiation of forbearance.

This study revises the mutual forbearance theory to align it with the accumulating empirical evidence that otherwise refutes its assumption and thereby improves theory’s descriptive and predictive power.